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Abstract
The analysis of efficiency and productivity in banking has received a great deal of attention for
almost three decades now. However, most of the literature to date has not explicitly accounted for
risk when measuring efficiency. We propose an analysis of profit efficiency taking into account how
the inclusion of a variety of bank risk measures might bias efficiency scores. Our measures of risk
are partly inspired by the literature on earnings management and earnings quality, keeping in mind
that loan loss provisions, as a generally accepted proxy for risk, can be adjusted to manage earn-
ings and regulatory capital. We also consider some variants of traditional models of profit efficiency
where different regimes are stipulated so that financial institutions can be evaluated in different
dimensions—i.e., prices, quantities, or prices and quantities simultaneously. We perform this anal-
ysis on the Spanish banking industry, whose institutions have been deeply affected by the current
international financial crisis, and where re-regulation is taking place. Our results can be explored
in multiple dimensions but, in general, they indicate that the impact of earnings management on
profit efficiency is of less magnitude than what might a priori be expected, and that on the whole,
savings banks have performed less well than commercial banks. However, savings banks are adapting
to the new regulatory scenario and rapidly catching up with commercial banks, especially in some
dimensions of performance.
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1. Introduction
Since the early eighties, the literature on bank efficiency and productivity has expanded dra-
matically, and the number of contributions continues to grow today. Indeed, the body of lit-
erature is large enough to have already warranted two surveys (Berger and Humphrey, 1997;
Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Since the latter of these surveys was published, further empiri-
cal evidence has become available, partly because the banking industries in several Western
economies have been substantially reshaped since the start of the international financial crisis
in 2007. Under these renewed circumstances, one may naturally inquire how banks’ efficiency
is affected or, perhaps more interestingly, analyze the links between pre-crisis and crisis effi-
ciency levels.
However, despite the large amount of relevant literature, some issues have not yet been
fully addressed. For instance, some now classic studies in the field such as Hughes and
Hughes and Mester (1993) or Mester (1996) and, more recently, Hughes and Mester (2009),
have pointed out that bank efficiency studies generally disregard the impact of risk and, con-
sequently, they miscalculate banks’ levels of inefficiency. This is important for many reasons,
one of them being that among the most fundamental causes of the international financial
crisis lies the issue of bank risk mismanagement. During the last twenty years, due to the
importance and growing relevance of this issue, although there was a notable increase in the
number of bank efficiency analyses that disregard risk, some papers did actually take it into
account, including Färe et al. (2004), Koetter (2008), Altunbas¸ et al. (2007) or, more recently,
Fiordelisi et al. (2011) and Epure and Lafuente (2014), among others.
Many of the contributions in this particular field have considered different proxies for risk,
among which the most extended approach has been to include loan loss provisions. Some
authors such as Berger and DeYoung (1997) argue that, alternatively, non-performing loans
might be a better option to measure bank risk, since loan loss provisions can be manipulated
more easily. However, this decision largely hinges on the availability of data, and it is usually
the case that data on non-performing loans are simply not available. In addition, since many
non-performing loans are finally repaid, to write off the whole amount of non-performing
loans as an expenditure might lead to overestimation of the effects of risk. However, as
Ahmed et al. (1999) note, although the purpose of loan loss provisions is to adjust banks’
loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on their portfolios, bank managers may also
have incentives to use them to manage earnings and regulatory capital. Pérez et al. (2008) state
that in the case of banks the accrual of loan loss provisions is left to bank managers’ discre-
tion (Beatty et al., 2002). The analysis of this industry becomes even more important due to
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inter-country differences in accounting and capital adequacy regulations (Laeven and Majnoni,
2003), or the regulatory changes within individual countries.
This and related issues have been considered by the earnings management and earnings
quality literatures (Dechow et al., 2010; Louis et al., 2013) but, despite its magnitude and im-
portance, it has received scant attention in studies into risk in bank efficiency. However, the
literature on earnings management and earnings quality is not conclusive as to the links be-
tween loan loss provisions and earnings; for instance, while Collins et al. (1995) find evidence
of a positive relationship between the two variables (which is consistent with smoothing earn-
ings via loan loss provisions), Beatty et al. (2002) found no evidence of earnings smoothing
(Ahmed et al., 1999).
Considering jointly the literature on bank efficiency (controlling for risk) and earnings
management and earnings quality has additional implications. Whereas most contributions
in the bank efficiency literature have been analyzing either cost or (input) technical effi-
ciency, far fewer studies analyze either revenue (or output technical efficiency), or profit ef-
ficiency. However, the magnitude and heterogeneity of the differences among financial institu-
tions when examining profit efficiency—which implies evaluating cost and revenue efficiency
simultaneously—are much higher. In addition, in our particular case, which analyzes the links
between earnings management and performance, it is clear we must adopt an approach which
takes earnings (and, therefore, earnings management and earnings quality) into account—i.e., a
profit efficiency approach.
Our analysis extends the existing literature in three main directions. First, we use several
variables to measure credit risk. In this regard, despite the advantages of non-performing
loans over loan loss provisions referred to by Berger and DeYoung (1997), the frequent un-
availability of the former measure, along with the ease with which loan loss provisions can
be manipulated, led us to consider an alternative strategy. Specifically, we consider some ac-
counting modifications to control provisions which add a discretional component to the use
of loan loss provisions—i.e., we will consider two additional proxies for credit risk that give
us an intuition about whether banks actually did manipulate this information during the ana-
lyzed period. Therefore, our profit frontier approach explicitly takes into account the quality
of those variables which affect the measurement of bank profits. This approach, as far as we
know, has never been used in the literature measuring bank efficiency—regardless of whether
risk is controlled for or not. However, an accurate profit frontier evaluation will hinge on the
quality of the components of profits. The literature on earnings quality and earnings manage-
ment (Roychowdhury, 2006; Dechow et al., 2010), as indicated, deals precisely with this. In our
setting, both the choices regarding when transactions occur (timeliness and timely loss recogni-
2
tion) and other choices made to manipulate the profits to be disclosed (Beaver and Engel, 1996)
are particularly relevant due to their impact on profits. This has been widely recognized in the
literature, since the expected future losses cannot be estimated with certainty and, therefore,
bank managers have relatively substantial discretion when setting loan loss provisions (LLP).
Although, in theory, discretion is exercised to provide best estimates of their portfolios’
expected losses, in practice, managers might have great incentives to manipulate LLP. These
incentives include, for instance, helping to reduce earnings volatility, enhancing managers’
compensation, or avoiding capital adequacy regulation. Several contributions have acknowl-
edged this reality (see, for instance Ahmed et al., 1999; Kim and Kross, 1998; Collins et al.,
1995), and much of the literature, especially studies focusing on the US, has extensively ana-
lyzed the determinants of the LLP decision. Our model controls for this decision by including
loan loss provisions (LLP) as an expenditure in the profit function and, in a subsequent step, in
order to offset the effects of their manipulation, we will consider expected as opposed to realized
LLP, for which we follow the recent proposals by Nichols et al. (2009). Specifically, as opposed
to other contributions adopting a static approach, Nichols et al. (2009) suggest estimating LLP
by taking into account not only present but also past and future non-performing loans. We
will therefore estimate three earnings management models, depending on whether we allow
bank managers to “manipulate” the LLP, or whether we estimate these provisions considering
both a time series and a cross-sectional approach.
Our second contribution consists of proposing three variants of our profit frontier model.
We estimate a non-convex short-run profit frontier model in the spirit of Prior (2003), taking
as a starting point the contributions of Färe et al. (1994) and Primont (1993). However, in
contrast to previous studies, we go beyond a model in which output and input prices are kept
constant—implying that market power might not exist, an assumption that recent literature
suggests might be implausible (Salas and Saurina, 2003; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara,
2007). We extend this basic model in two main directions. In the first one banks are allowed
to influence quantities only, i.e., they are price-acceptant, whereas in the second one banks are
able to influence prices. We refer to these three models as the unconstrained profit model, the
price-constrained profit model and the quantity-constrained profit model, respectively. For all
three profit frontier models we will consider three variants depending on the degree to which
LLP are manipulable—i.e., one model subject to manipulation, and two models in which the
estimation of LLP are plugged in.
Finally, we apply the analysis to the Spanish banking system, for which there is compelling
evidence available on its performance (see, for instance Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1999). How-
ever, contributions with an explicit concern about risk are almost non-existent. In addition,
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very few contributions have adopted a profit frontier approach. We consider this to be a rele-
vant context, especially in light of the difficulties facing many Spanish commercial and savings
banks following the crash of the housing market, and the threat that this represents for the en-
tire European banking industry. In addition, the Spanish banking system is going through
a deep re-regulatory change whose impact on the industry has not yet been examined. Our
strategy to estimate LLP also fits the Spanish banking system particularly well, due to the
dynamic LLP scheme introduced by the Bank of Spain in 2000.
Results can be summarized from multiple angles. Our combination of profit frontier mod-
els (unconstrained, price-constrained, and quantity-constrained) and proxies for risk gives us
a total of nine models. Whereas there are several differences depending on the profit frontier
model considered, little heterogeneity is found when comparing results yielded by models
with varying degrees of LLP discretion, suggesting that the likely impact of LLP manipulation
on profit efficiency is limited. This result is robust across profit frontier models, time (pre-crisis
or crisis years) and types of firms (commercial or savings banks). The differences, however,
are quite large, and significant, when considering the context—time or type of firm. During
the pre-crisis years, commercial banks performed better than savings banks, regardless of the
model considered. In the 2008-2010 period, savings banks caught up with banks and, for some
particular models, their efficiency is higher, suggesting that they are adapting rapidly to the
new regulatory scenario.
The article is organized as follows. After this introduction, section 2 presents the model
considered to measure profit efficiency taking into account risk preferences, and the data is
described in section 3. The results from the working of our analytical proposal are interpreted
in section 4 and, finally, some concluding remarks are outlined in section 5.
2. The analytical framework
Some banks perform better than others. This is an indisputable fact, but how do we actually
recognize a high performing bank? Is a very profitable bank a high performer? Before provid-
ing the answer to this question, we have to consider the degree of reliability we should accord
to the variables needed to define banking industry profits. In order to do this, we first need to
define the synthetic components that make up the profits of a banking firm:
Π = Revenues−Operating costs− Loan loss provisions =
=
M
∑
m=1
rmum −
N
∑
n=1
pnxn −
O
∑
o=1
ponplo (1)
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where Π are the profits, rm and um are the price and quantity for output m (m = 1, . . . ,M),
respectively, pn and xn are the price and quantity for input n (n = 1, . . . ,N), respectively, po is
the estimated price (say, the percentage of write-offs) for non-performing asset o, and nplo refers
to its monetary value (quantity).
Clearly, the degree of accuracy of Π depends on the quality of each of its basic elements.
In this regard, in the framework of agency theory, a well developed stream in the accounting
literature addresses the assessment of the quality of the variables that have an impact on
periodic profits, namely, the literature on earnings quality (see, for instance Dechow et al.,
2010, for a review of some of the variables employed by this literature). On the one hand,
under some specific circumstances there are several choices to consider at the moment when
transactions occur—or incentives exist to manipulate real operations (Roychowdhury, 2006)—
and this can affect the amount of flow of real variables to consider (um, xn, nplo). This is
what the literature on earnings quality refers to as timeliness and timely loss recognition
(Dechow et al., 2010). On the other hand, when prices are determined internally (a situation
that could affect both pn and po), subjective and opportunistic choices could be considered
in order to “embellish” (or “manipulate”) the profits to be disclosed. In this respect, in the
particular case of the banking industry, the manipulation of profits is commonly oriented to
deal with the problems caused by credit risk—bad loans, problem loans or provisions for loans
losses (see, for instance Beaver and Engel, 1996).
Dechow and Dichev (2002) define higher profit quality as existing when earnings and cash
flows follow the same pace. They document that earnings quality is poorer for smaller firms,
which experience losses and greater volatility in sales and cash flows. Some of these char-
acteristics are present in the Spanish banking industry, which provides the rationale for our
research objectives.
Another perspective on earnings quality is that some banks also have incentives to reduce
volatility by decreasing earnings in years with unexpectedly strong performance, and increas-
ing earnings in years with weak performance. A smoother stream of earnings might help to re-
duce the information asymmetry between managers and outside investors (Beatty and Harris,
1999; Beatty et al., 2002; Liu and Ryan, 2006). The majority of previous studies find evidence
that managers smooth earnings via loan loss provision and recognize security gains and losses.
Accordingly, these are the variables to be accounted for when the quality of the earnings is
under scrutiny.
Different approaches can be considered to incorporate the risk-taking behavior of banks in
estimating efficiency indicators. Following previous literature, non-performing loans can be
incorporated into the production function of banks as a bad output (or, in terms of the profit
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function, an expense that decreases total profits). Under Spanish accounting standards, banks
must classify a loan as non-performing when either interest or principal payments are more
than 90 days overdue. In addition, all loans granted to borrowers in default are also considered
as non-performing, irrespective of whether or not they are overdue.
Because many of these loans are finally repaid, to write off the whole amount of non-
performing loans (npl) as an expenditure would lead us to overestimate the effects of risk
on profit efficiency scores. Hence, we undertake an alternative approach which consists of
including loan loss provisions (LLP, defining LLP = ∑Oo=1 ponplo) as an expenditure in the
profit function. Under Spanish banking regulations, bank managers estimate LLP following a
strict set of rules devised by the Bank of Spain, which depend heavily on the time overdue.
However, Bank of Spain rules determine the minimum losses a bank must recognize once
a loan has been defined as non-performing, leaving the banks with considerable room for
discretion.1 To mitigate the effects of the potential manipulation of LLP, our approach consists of
using expected loan loss provisions as an expenditure, instead of realized loan loss provisions.
This would reveal whether banks’ loan loss provision decisions to manage earnings or capital
(and, therefore, circumvent strict accounting rules by over- or under-provisioning assets, or
misclassifying them) are successful or not. As indicated by Pérez et al. (2008), if they were
successful, having painstaking regulations on LLP might be irrelevant, and that “there is merit
in having more principles-oriented accounting standards” (Pérez et al., 2008, p.424).
Expected, or “non-manipulated” loan loss provisions are estimated at the bank level, fol-
lowing the proposals by Nichols et al. (2009). In particular, we regress LLP on the increase in
npl in npl in t− 2, t− 1 (backward looking component) and t. Furthermore, in order to control
for accounting conservatism, the increase in npl in t+ 1 is also incorporated in our regression
model as an independent variable (forward looking component):
LLP
not manipulated
t = β0 + β1△nplt−2 + β2△nplt−1 + β3△nplt + β4△npl t+1 + εt (2)
We run a regression for each bank for the sample period. To carry out the estimation,
two different specifications are considered. We first include total loan loss provisions as the
dependent variable, considering not only the specific component of loan losses, but also the
dynamic loan loss provisions, which were introduced by the Bank of Spain in 2000. Since the
dynamic provisioning system had a deep impact on the relationship between npl and LLP, we
run a second set of regressions excluding the dynamic, or time series, loan loss provisions from
1However, some authors such as Pérez et al. (2008) consider the Bank of Spain enforces strict regulations on
the accrual of loan loss provisions which would impose, a priori, considerable restrictions on banks’ ability to use
managerial discretion.
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the dependent variable.2 This gives us two sets of “non-manipulated” loan loss provisions, i.e.
static (cross-section) and dynamic (time series), for which we consider this counter-cyclical
loan loss provision.3
Having estimated the degree of earnings manipulation present in the Spanish banking
system, we estimate a non-convex short-run profit frontier model. This model basically follows
Färe et al. (1994), taking the original variables (in the case of the bad output, considering the
realized loan loss provisions only) and classifying the inputs into variable (xv) and fixed (x f )
inputs (see also Primont, 1993, for a short-run cost frontier definition). Therefore, we will be
modeling variable profit maximization:
Πmanip
(
rjm, pjv, pjo
)
= max(z,um,xv,nplo)
(
∑
M
m=1 rjmum − ∑
V
v=1 pjvxv −∑
O
o=1 pjonplo
)
s.t.
∑
J
j=1 zjujm ≥ um, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjxjv ≤ xv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjxj f ≤ xj f , f= 1, . . . , F,
∑
J
j=1 zjnpl jo ≤ nplo, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zj = 1,
zj = [0, 1].
(3)
where rjm ∈ R
M
+ is the vector of output prices for bank j, rjm ≥ 0, and we also have variable
inputs (netputs) with prices pjv ∈ R
V
+, v = 1, . . . ,V. Analogously, uj ∈ R
M
+ is the vector of
output quantities for j, xjv ∈ R
V
+ are the variable netputs for bank j and xj f ∈ R
F
+ are the fixed
netputs for the same bank. However, with respect to the contributions of Färe et al. (1994) and
Primont (1993) we are considering here the role of risk via loan loss provisions. Therefore,
we have that nplj ∈ R
O
+ is the amount of non-performing loans for bank j, o = 1, . . . ,O, and
pjo ∈ R
O
+ will be their prices.
As a second step, we will re-run the previous variable profit maximization model (3), but
2In 2000 the Bank of Spain promulgated the so-called “statistical provision”, according to which banks had to
use their own reserves to cover realized losses, making it easier for banks to maintain provisions for incurred losses
embedded in the credit portfolios created in expansion years. This rule ultimately enforced a counter-cyclical LLP
that resulted in income smoothing practices by banks (Pérez et al., 2008, p.425).
3Considering cross section and time series estimations is also relevant because of their economic implications
since the former would be adopting an industry perspective (i.e., each bank is compared with the rest of the banks
in the sample), whereas the latter implies being compared only with the bank itself and therefore would be focusing
on income smoothing.
7
replacing the variables subject to manipulation with their estimated values:
Πnot manip
(
rjm, pjn, p˜jo
)
= max(z,um,xv,nplo)
(
∑
M
m=1 rjmum − ∑
V
v=1 pjvxv −∑
O
o=1 p˜jon˜plo
)
s.t.
∑
J
j=1 zjujm ≥ um, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjxjv ≤ xv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjxj f ≤ xj f , f= 1, . . . , F,
∑
J
j=1 zjn˜pl j,o ≤ n˜plo, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zj = 1,
zj = [0, 1].
(4)
Obviously, Πnot manip
(
rjm, pjv, p˜jo
)
will provide a more objective profit target for each bank,
as profits generated by earnings manipulation are controlled for in this second program.
The problem of programs (3) and (4) is that potential outputs and inputs are estimated in
order to maximize profits for the unit under analysis, keeping constant the corresponding
output and input prices. This assumption is equivalent to considering that prices are de-
termined in competitive markets, so that firms cannot implement any strategy to influence
market prices, or that local markets can absorb any level of output without any change in
output prices. This assumption can be strong in the Spanish banking industry, where recent
studies have been analyzing whether market power exists (see, for instance Maudos and Pérez,
2003; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Salas and Saurina, 2003). From the theoreti-
cal point of view, in the efficiency literature there are also contributions indicating the prob-
lems caused by setting prices in non-fully competitive settings (Camanho and Dyson, 2006;
Portela and Thanassoulis, 2014; Portela, 2014; Tone, 2002; Tone and Tsutsui, 2007).
To confirm with our data the extent to which banks are oriented towards the maximization
of profits in an imperfect competition setting, we followed the Monopolist Axiom of Profits
Maximization (proposed by Varian, 1984) and, more specifically, the condition of downward
sloping demand function:
(ri − rj).(ui − uj) ≤ 0 (5)
After estimating expression (5) for all possible combinations of output quantities and prices
for each unit/year, the results indicated that for more than 89% of the possible comparisons,
the condition was not met—i.e., the sign was negative. This might constitute evidence sup-
porting the existence of market power, as previously found by Maudos and Pérez (2003). This
would imply that we cannot artificially deal with quantities and prices separately, meaning
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that the two previous programs oriented towards the estimation of the profit frontier are not
applicable.
One way to overcome this limitation can be to make the profit function to be dependent on
the total revenues minus costs as in the following expression:
Π = Revenues−Operating costs− Loan loss provisions
=
M
∑
m=1
Rm −
V
∑
v=1
VCv−
O
∑
o=1
LLPo
(6)
where Rm = rmum, VCv = pvxv and LLPo = ponplo.
This serves to define a profit frontier program depending on the revenues and the costs by
combining feasible amounts of quantities and prices.
First we consider model 0, also referred to as the unconstrained variable profit model,
which is defined as follows:
Π0
(
FCj f
)
= max(z,Rm,VCv ,LLPo) ∑
M
m=1 Rm − ∑
V
v=1VCv −∑
O
o=1 LLPo
s.t.
∑
J
j=1 zjRjm ≥ Rm, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjVCjv ≤ VCv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjFCj f ≤ FCj f , f= 1, . . . , F,
∑
J
j=1 zjLLPjo ≤ LLPo, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zj = 1,
zj = [0, 1].
(7)
From the optimal solution of this program, we can obtain the optimal revenues (R∗m
and, subsequently, the optimal values of output prices r∗m = ∑
J
j=1 z
∗
j rjm and physical outputs
u∗m = ∑
J
j=1 z
∗
j ujm), the optimal values of variable costs (VC
∗
v and, subsequently, the optimal val-
ues of variable input prices p∗v = ∑
J
j=1 z
∗
j pjv and physical variable inputs x
∗
v = ∑
J
j=1 z
∗
j xjv), the
optimal values for the loan loss provisions (LLP∗o and, subsequently, the optimal values of loss
recognition p∗o = ∑
J
j=1 z
∗
j pjo).
In the second stage, we consider the constrained model 1. Compared with the uncon-
strained model 0, in model 1 banking firms are price-acceptant and can influence quantities
only. We will refer to this as the price-constrained variable profit model, according to which
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we will have that:
Π1
(
rjm, pjv, pj f , pjo, xj f
)
= max(z,um,xv)
(
∑
M
m=1 rjmum −∑
V
v=1 pjvxv − ∑
O
o=1 pjonplo
)
s.t.
∑
J
j=1 zjujm ≥ um, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjrjm = rjm, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjxjv ≤ xv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjpjv = pjv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjxj f ≤ xj f , f= 1, . . . , F,
∑
J
j=1 zjnpl jo ≤ nplo, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zjpjo = pjo , o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zj = 1,
zj = [0, 1].
(8)
Finally, we can also have model 2, which we refer to as the quantity-constrained vari-
able profit model, which assumes that banks can influence output and input prices but not
quantities, according to which:
Π2
(
ujm, xjv, xj f , npljo
)
=
= max(z,rm,pv,po,)
(
∑
M
m=1 rmujm −∑
V
v=1 pvxjv − ∑
O
o=1 ponpl jo
)
s.t.
∑
J
j=1 zjujm = ujm, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjrjm ≥ rm, m= 1, . . . , M,
∑
J
j=1 zjxjv = xjv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjpjv ≤ pv, v= 1, . . . , V,
∑
J
j=1 zjxj f ≤ xj f , f= 1, . . . , F,
∑
J
j=1 zjnpl jo = nplo, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zjpjo ≤ po, o = 1, . . . , O,
∑
J
j=1 zj = 1,
zj = [0, 1].
(9)
Figure 1 illustrates the three models defined above to synthesize the characteristics of the
proposed evaluation process. As can be seen, model 0 (unconstrained profit model) tries
to maximize profits by estimating of the optimal level of revenues and operating costs, con-
strained not to have more fixed inputs than the observed values. This means that to remedy the
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inefficiencies found, inefficient banks should try to introduce modifications both to the outputs
and operating inputs side as well as to the output and to the operating input prices. Reducing
the options available, assuming that output and input prices are negotiated on competitive
markets, model 1 estimates the profit inefficiency due to suboptimal levels in the outputs and
the operating inputs, keeping the respective prices constant.
By definition, this will produce a smaller level of inefficiency than model 0 or, put the
other way round, the differences between models 0 and 1 are due to rigidity on the prices
side. One can compare model 1 (price-constrained profit model) with the standard programs
of technical efficiency because, at the end of the day, both programs orient their assessment
to the consideration of quantities. If this is true, model 1 will always have a better impact on
profits than DEA models, as the radial increase (decrease) in outputs (inputs) does not signify
that their movement should mechanically improve the level of potential profits. In contrast,
our proposedmodel 1 allows to change the output and input mixes in order to improve profits.
From another perspective, model 2 (quantity-constrained profit model) estimates the profit
frontier trying to optimize the corresponding output and operating input prices, given the
observed levels of outputs and operating inputs. This is the case when, for instance, local
markets restrict levels of activity once a certain limit is reached. In these circumstances, man-
agers should orient their strategy to find the optimal levels of output and input prices (and
the optimal level of financial risk) that allow the bank to improve its net profits. As a result of
this, the differences between model 0 and model 2 are due to rigidity in the level of activity; in
these circumstances, when the activity level is not a controlled variable, the consideration of
prices and the risk assumed can drive increases in the level of profitability.
3. Data and variables
Our decomposition of banks’ profits requires detailed information on revenues, costs and loan
loss provisions. All three magnitudes have associated both quantities and their corresponding
prices. In the particular case of loan loss provisions these associated quantities correspond to
the non-performing loans. In the case of costs, the three specified categories correspond to the
cost of funds (total interest expenses), the cost of labor (personnel expenses), and other operat-
ing expenses. We will refer to these three magnitudes as VC1, VC2 and FC1, respectively—the
two former variables reflect variable costs, whereas the latter refers to the costs generated by
fixed assets and consequently represents a fixed cost. These three cost categories are generated
by their corresponding input categories, i.e. loanable funds (or financial capital, xv1), number
of employees (xv2), and fixed assets (or physical capital, x f1).
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Defining bank outputs is a more difficult task. These difficulties have been an enduring
concern (some initial and relevant contributions were Fixler and Zieschang (1992) and, in the
context of efficiency in banking, Berger and Humphrey (1992). As indicated by Tortosa-Ausina
(2002), there are three approaches to define banks’ output, i.e., the asset approach, the value
added approach and the user cost approach. All these three approaches correspond to the
intermediation approach (as opposed to the production approach), which has been the most
extended way of defining bank activities. The definition of bank outputs it has generally been
conditioned by the available statistical information, which in most cases is rather poor. This
has meant that most studies have disregarded the user cost approach and often also the value
added approach, for similar reasons.
However, as indicated by Colangelo and Inklaar (2012), statistical agencies have usually
considered the user cost approach, according to which banks do not charge explicit fees
for many of the services they provide but bundle the payment for services with the inter-
est rates charged on loans and paid for deposits. This approach has recently received a new
twist thanks to recent contributions by Colangelo and Inklaar (2012), Basu et al. (2011) and
Diewert et al. (2012), since the latest international financial crisis suggests there could be some
mis-measurements in the banking sector.4 Yet most of these proposals are based on informa-
tion that is only available at the country level. Therefore, extending these revamped contribu-
tions to the bank level is just not possible because, in general, the information they use is not
available at this individual level of disaggregation.
In this study we have the added difficulty that since we are focusing on the detailed de-
composition of bank profits we must be able to attach each particular revenue to each output
category. This implies that our approach to define output is not strictly the asset approach
because we are considering other output categories apart from assets. Specifically, we con-
sider two outputs, namely: (i) loans, which represent traditional lending activity; and (ii) other
operating income, which refers to non-lending activities.
An added difficulty relates to the incorporation of the risk-taking behavior of banks in the
estimation of efficiency scores, for which three different approaches are considered. Follow-
ing previous literature, we first incorporate non-performing loans (NPL) into the production
function of banks as a bad output. Under Spanish accounting standards, Spanish banks have
to classify a loan as non-performing when either interest or principal payments are more than
90 days overdue. In addition, all loans granted to the borrowers in default are also consid-
ered as non-performing, irrespective of whether or not they are overdue. As for the inputs,
4Specifically, Colangelo and Inklaar (2012) argue that the methodology currently used in the euro area (and in
many other economies) is flawed because it does not take into account the risk characteristics of loans and deposits.
We also account for risk, although in a different fashion.
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they consist of: (i) total interest expenses; (ii) personnel expenses; and (iii) other operating
expenses. Table 1 provides detailed definitions of inputs, outputs, and their correspondence
prices. Analogously, Table 2 provides definitions for the loan loss provisions, non-performing
loans and their associated prices.
We selected Spanish banking firms for the 1997–2003 period. Our sample includes both
commercial and savings banks. Inputs and outputs data to estimate efficiency were provided
by Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database and come from each firms’ balance sheets and profit and
loss account except for data on number of employees, which was obtained from Spanish Bank-
ing Association (AEB, “Asociación Española de Banca”) for commercial banks and the Spanish
Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA, “Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorro”) for
savings banks; data on credit risk variables was taken from each institution’s annual report.
All monetary variables are expressed in thousands of euros. After removing some unreliable
data and excluding all non-consistent values (such as zero total assets or zero employees) we
have a total of 352 observations for all the sample years.
4. Results
The results can be explored from multiple perspectives. Taking into account the rationale
presented in the preceding sections, we consider five of them: (i) results for the unconstrained,
price-constrained and quantity-constrained model; (ii) results for the manipulated and non-
manipulated model (either static or dynamic); (iii) results for the different types of banks
considered (commercial banks, savings banks, or all banks); (iv) results for all years, pre-crisis
and crisis years; (v) and results for efficient vs. inefficient banks.
All these results are reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Each table refers to the three periods
and sub-periods considered (all, pre-crisis, and crisis years). Tables are divided into three
panels referring to the type of constraint considered (unconstrained profit model in the upper
panel, price-constrained profit model in the central panel, and quantity-constrained profit
model in the lower panel). The different rows in each panel report results according to either
manipulated or non-manipulated models, and also considering the different types of firms—
all banks, commercial banks, and savings banks. Finally, the columns in each table report
results for both efficient and inefficient units, as well as the percentage of efficient firms.
4.1. Unconstrained vs. price-constrained vs. quantity-constrained models
We provide summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) in each of the tables considered
(Tables 3, 4, and 5). Comparing the three panels displayed in each of the tables, it is apparent
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that the quantity-constrained profit model (according to which banks can only optimize prices,
with quantities fixed) yields more favorable results—i.e., the ROA lost due to inefficiencies
is lower than both the unconstrained and the price-constrained models. This is a general
result, robust to the different periods considered, types of firms, or either manipulated or non-
manipulated models, implying that when banks are able to adjust their prices—on both on the
costs and revenues sides—the amount of inefficiency decreases sharply.
According to the market prices, we are trying to improve profits through the changes in the
quantities of inputs and outputs. The difference from the existent standard models (Färe et al.,
1994) is that in our case prices appear in the restrictions while prices are not considered in the
alternative definition and, therefore, the efforts are directed towards the physical quantities in
order to maximize profits. In other words, the standard proposal (Färe et al., 1994) is appro-
priate when competitive markets exist, driving banking firms to be price-acceptant. However,
when imperfect markets exist (as in the case of the Spanish banking sector), our proposed
models (unconstrained, price-constrained, and quantity-constrained) contribute to disentangle
the extent to which profit inefficiencies are caused by imperfect amounts of quantities or by
sub-optimal output and input prices.
If we consider the decomposition by type of bank (commercial or savings), whose behavior
is reported in the different rows in each table, the differences observed are indeed considerable.
This is a robust result across the different models and sub-periods considered, although in
some cases the differences are especially remarkable. For instance, for the price-constrained
profit model (central panel in each table), the magnitude of the inefficiencies for savings banks
is almost ten times that for commercial banks (see the central panel in Table 4). In contrast,
in the case of the quantity-constrained profit model, the differences between the two types of
bank are much less obvious—although they are still notable.
Although there could be multiple explanations for this difference, the specific literature
on bank ownership and efficiency (Altunbas¸ et al., 2001), as well as the broader literature
on ownership of banks (La Porta et al., 2002) have forcefully made the point that it could be
relevant to banks’ performance. In the case of Spanish banking, and in the particular case of
savings banks, (Illueca et al., 2014) argue that the political ties of some board members might
have affected the decision-making process in those firms. More specifically, the likely sources
for initially inquiry into whether savings banks do actually maximize profits or not include
the political causes resulting from boards with strong political ties, the inefficiencies deriving
from an absence of market for corporate control, social corporate responsibility issues, or the
cost of the geographic expansions carried out by these firms over more than fifteen years.
These issues have been analyzed in detail by Crespí et al. (2004), García-Cestona and Surroca
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(2008), Prior and Surroca (2006), Surroca and García-Cestona (2006), Illueca et al. (2009) and,
more recently, Illueca et al. (2014).
Tables 4 and 5 extend the analysis in Table 3 to the two sub-periods considered, i.e., pre-
crisis (1997–2007) and crisis years (2008–2010), respectively. It is apparent that the differences
between commercial banks and savings banks were especially large during the pre-crisis (or
expansion) years, especially in the case of the price-constrained profit model. However, during
the crisis years, the differences have shrunk substantially, especially considering the quantity-
constrained profit model, as shown by the lower panel in Table 5. There may be multiple
reasons for this behavior, but they could be largely related to the recent restructuring which
is markedly reshaping the Spanish banking industry, since most savings banks will ultimately
be recast as full commercial banks—including in terms of type of ownership. In this regard,
the geographic contraction policies (especially for those banks involved in mergers) and the
greater difficulties facing members of savings banks’ boards of directors who have specific
political affiliations during the crisis years may be contributing to boost convergence between
commercial banks and savings banks (Illueca et al., 2014).
4.2. Manipulated vs. non-manipulated models
As indicated above, Tables 3, 4, and 5 also provide also information split according to the way
we controlled for risk, i.e., the manipulated earnings model, the non-manipulated short-run
model, and the non-manipulated long-run model. Several features emerge, some of which
are worth mentioning. First, the differences among the three models are modest. Despite
specific statistical tests to analyze whether these differences are significant or not, the mag-
nitude of the differences across the three types of models according to the way risk enters
the models is rather limited compared with the differences found across the unconstrained,
price-constrained and quantity-constrained profit models.
The magnitude of these differences is, on average, particularly low when considering the
entire period (Table 3) and the pre-crisis years (Table 4). For instance, in the case of the price-
constrained profit model for all years (Table 3), on average, the results are quite similar for
all banks, commercial banks or savings banks; for example, in the case of savings banks the
means are 1.3861, 1.3618 and 1.3697 for the manipulated earnings, non-manipulated short-
run, and non-manipulated long-run model, respectively. In the case of commercial banks, and
considering all banking firms jointly, the magnitude of the discrepancies is also very low.
However, there are slight differences for both the unconstrained and the quantity-constrained
profit models (upper and lower panels in Tables 3 and 4). In the case of the unconstrained
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profit model, these differences are basically driven by savings banks’ behavior which, contrary
to what one might expect, is actually more inefficient in the case of the manipulated earnings
model. This result is shown in the upper panels of Tables 3 and 4. It is also extended to the
crisis years (Table 5), although for this particular period the magnitude of the differences is
much lower compared to the previous period.
Yet for the quantity-constrained profit model (lower panel in Tables 3 and 4), the ineffi-
ciencies found are lower for the manipulated earnings model, and this behavior can also be
extended to the crisis years (Table 5). Of particular note is the fact that whereas commercial
banks’ behavior for this quantity-constrained profit model is similar for both the pre-crisis and
crisis years, in the case of savings banks the differences are remarkable, suggesting that the
restructuring of the Spanish banking system is having a marked effect on the behavior of these
financial institutions.
In these estimations, the manipulation of the accounting variables (both short-run and
long-run models) does not change the overall picture. This situation can be illustrative of two
very different situations. First, on average, the manipulation of the accounting variables has a
reduced impact on the levels of profit efficiency. This does not imply that the worst performers
would probably have incentives to manipulate their accounts, but this behavior does not have
significant results on the averages corresponding to the sector. Second, it may well be that as
the manipulation of the accounting information is important, we do not perceive any bias on
the potential manipulators, as similar procedures are followed by both efficient and inefficient
banks. Further research is needed to disentangle this in the near future.
4.3. Analyzing the significance of the differences found
We can also formally test for the statistical significance of differences between the results re-
ported in Tables 3, 4 and 5. The results in these tables provide summary statistics of the results
for the different profit models under consideration. In some cases (especially when comparing
commercial banks with savings banks, or results for different time periods) the differences
were notable. In others (especially when comparing the different ways to control for risk) the
differences were negligible. In neither case, however, did we formally test for those differences.
We can follow some proposals such as Li (1996, 1999) or Fan and Ullah (1999), who pro-
posed nonparametric tests to compare two unknown distributions that we may refer to as f (x)
and g(x). Thus, we would be testing the null hypothesis that H0 : f (·) = g(·) against the
alternative H1 : f (x) 6= g(x). In our particular case, these f (x) vs. g(x) comparisons would
refer to the variety of models and contexts present inin Tables 3, 4 and 5.
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Specifically, we consider two types of comparisons of distributions, namely, contextual and
across models. In the former we refer to f (x) and g(x) distinguishing between commercial
banks and savings banks, or between pre-crisis and crisis years. In the latter, we refer to f (x)
and g(x) distinguishing between the variety of models considered.
Results are shown in Tables 6 and 7 for the contextual and across models comparisons,
respectively. One of the main advantages of the proposals by Li (1996, 1999), or Fan and Ullah
(1999), is that they do not actually test for differences between some summary statistics of
the distributions of interest but for the entire distributions themselves, using kernel methods.
The aspect, or shape, of these distribution is depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The results on the
differences observed among the different densities depicted in the two figures are reported in
Tables 6 and 7.
The results in Tables 6 and 7 generally corroborate the results presented in the preceding
subsections. When comparing results for commercial banks vs. savings banks (upper panel
in Table 6) the differences are statistically significant when the entire period or the pre-crisis
years are considered. However, the differences are not significant during the crisis years, with
the exception of the price-constrained profit model, for which the differences are significant,
although only at the 10% significance level. In the lower panel of Table 6, results indicate
whether the differences are significant when comparing the results for the pre-crisis and crisis
years, and they turn out to be strongly significant, but for savings banks only. This result is
robust across the range of models considered.
Table 7 provides results on formal testing for the differences across models. Results indicate
that the differences are mostly non-significant when comparing the different ways to control or,
more accurately, when comparing the manipulated earnings model with the non-manipulated
earnings model—either short- or long-run. The bivariate kernel density functions, in which
the different variables considered are the results for the different models, strongly corroborate
this finding, as the probability mass is tightly concentrated along the 45-degree main diagonal
(see Figures 4, 5 and 6). In contrast, when comparing the results for the market power models
(Figures 7, 8 and 9), results differ sharply, as shown by the probability mass shifting clock-
wise, indicating marked differences in the results for the unconstrained, price-constrained and
quantity-constrained profit models.
5. Conclusions
For more than two decades now the analysis of the efficiency and productivity of financial in-
stitutions has received a great deal of attention. The magnitude and length of the international
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financial crisis has afforded a new perspective on the available evidence, shifting the relevance
of the aspects dealt with by this literature.
Some recent contributions have shown great interest in carefully defining banks’ inputs
and, more importantly (due to the difficulties in measuring them), outputs, among which we
may highlight those by Basu et al. (2011), Colangelo and Inklaar (2012) or Diewert et al. (2012).
In this article, we extend this relevant literature, although with more modest aims due to data
limitations, to the specific analysis of how controlling for risk may influence the analysis of
financial institutions’ performance.
Controlling for risk is actually a major limitation in most studies of financial institutions’
performance, mostly due to lack of data; however we try to fill this gap in the literature
by providing a painstaking comparison of the results yielded by different earnings manage-
ment models, namely, a naive model in which bank managers can “manipulate” the results
compared with those provided by two accounting models in which loan loss provisions are
estimated in the first stage and then plugged into the profit model in the second stage.
In this respect, another contribution of the paper is its presentation of a profit model in
which banks can set prices non-competitively. This modeling is consistent with recent contri-
butions that have found the existence of market power in some European banking industries
such as the Spanish banking industry, on which we focus.
Results are explored from several perspectives. In general, they indicate that results for
the manipulated and non-manipulated earnings model do not show marked differences—
following some nonparametric tests, the differences found were not statistically significant. In
contrast, these differences were notable for the different competitive models considered, when
comparing commercial banks and savings banks, or when comparing results for either the
pre-crisis or crisis years.
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Table 1: Definition of costs, revenues, inputs, outputs, and the associated prices
Revenues and costs Outputs and inputs Output and input prices
Revenues, R Definition
Output
(quantity), y
Definition Output price, r Definition
R1
Interest income (interest
income on loans + other
interest income)
y1 Customer loans r1
Price corresponding to
y1
R2 Other operating income y2 Other operating income r2
Price corresponding to
y2
Operating costs,
VC, FC
Definition
Input (quantity),
xv, x f
Definition
Input price,
wv,w f
Definition
VC1 Total interest expenses xv1
Loanable funds
(=financial capital)
wv1 wv1 = VC1/xv1
VC2 Personnel expenses xv2 Number of employees wv2 wv2 = VC2/xv2
FC1
Other operating ex-
penses
x f1
Fixed assets (=physical
capital)
w f1 w f1 = FC1/x f1
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Table 2: Definition of loan loss provisions, non-performing loans and the associated prices
Loan loss
provisions,
LLP
Definition
Non-
performing
loan
(quantity), npl
Definition
Non-
performing
loan price, r
Definition
LLP Loan loss provisions npl Loan loss provisions wl1
Price corresponding
to loan loss
provisions npl
LLP+ llp1
LLP+increase cor-
responding to the
specific and generic
provision
npl Non-performing
loans
wl2
Price corresponding
to loan loss
provisions npl
LLP+ llp2
LLP+increase which
also includes the
counter-cyclical
provision
npl Non-performing
loans
wl′2
Price corresponding
to loan loss
provisions npl
LLP+ llp1
(predicted)
Predicted value for
LLP+ llp1
npl
Non-performing
loans
wl3
Price corresponding
to loan loss
provisions npl
LLP+ llp2
(predicted)
Predicted value for
LLP+ llp2
npl
Non-performing
loans
wl′3
Price corresponding
to loan loss
provisions npl
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Table 3: Evaluation of profit efficiency, all years (1997–2010)
Unconstrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.7037 1.2621 1.8098 1.4476 61.1157
Commercial banks 0.2300 0.7143 1.5142 1.1940 84.8123
Savings banks 1.1423 1.4821 1.8781 1.4932 39.1785
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.6561 1.1441 1.6390 1.2882 59.9672
Commercial banks 0.2245 0.6883 1.3425 1.1579 83.2765
Savings banks 1.0557 1.3234 1.7135 1.3097 38.3886
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.6583 1.1616 1.6410 1.3235 59.8852
Commercial banks 0.2304 0.6925 1.2985 1.1505 82.2526
Savings banks 1.0544 1.3526 1.7336 1.3530 39.1785
Price-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.7993 1.5082 2.0909 1.8033 61.7719
Commercial banks 0.1654 0.6098 1.1969 1.2123 86.1775
Savings banks 1.3861 1.8227 2.2789 1.8514 39.1785
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.7838 1.4648 2.0372 1.7394 61.5258
Commercial banks 0.1594 0.6044 1.1827 1.2305 86.5188
Savings banks 1.3618 1.7610 2.2103 1.7771 38.3886
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.7890 1.4721 2.0334 1.7483 61.1977
Commercial banks 0.1618 0.6068 1.1850 1.2242 86.3481
Savings banks 1.3697 1.7701 2.2061 1.7893 37.9147
Quantity-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.4831 0.6292 1.0033 0.5479 51.8458
Commercial banks 0.3482 0.6435 1.1728 0.6539 70.3072
Savings banks 0.6080 0.5893 0.9319 0.4798 34.7551
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.5430 0.6918 1.1049 0.5940 50.8614
Commercial banks 0.3930 0.7172 1.2867 0.7308 69.4539
Savings banks 0.6817 0.6373 1.0275 0.5065 33.6493
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.5538 0.7019 1.1233 0.5994 50.6973
Commercial banks 0.4060 0.7291 1.2931 0.7388 68.6007
Savings banks 0.6906 0.6468 1.0484 0.5095 34.1232
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Table 4: Evaluation of profit efficiency, pre-crisis years (1997–2007)
Unconstrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.7445 1.2444 1.7607 1.3688 57.7148
Commercial banks 0.2367 0.7187 1.5090 1.1762 84.3137
Savings banks 1.2484 1.4370 1.8178 1.4040 31.3230
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.7000 1.1360 1.6001 1.2289 56.2500
Commercial banks 0.2321 0.6937 1.3154 1.1452 82.3529
Savings banks 1.1643 1.2893 1.6717 1.2403 30.3502
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.6976 1.1424 1.5945 1.2463 56.2500
Commercial banks 0.2366 0.6951 1.2835 1.1340 81.5686
Savings banks 1.1551 1.3047 1.6771 1.2632 31.1284
Price-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.8299 1.4702 1.9948 1.6952 58.3984
Commercial banks 0.1677 0.5925 1.1561 1.1355 85.4902
Savings banks 1.4868 1.7589 2.1711 1.7413 31.5175
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.8202 1.4424 1.9533 1.6561 58.0078
Commercial banks 0.1603 0.5810 1.1198 1.1389 85.6863
Savings banks 1.4750 1.7179 2.1237 1.6944 30.5447
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.8260 1.4493 1.9444 1.6648 57.5195
Commercial banks 0.1631 0.5865 1.1241 1.1417 85.4902
Savings banks 1.4837 1.7254 2.1125 1.7060 29.7665
Quantity-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.5109 0.6356 1.0004 0.5489 48.9258
Commercial banks 0.3485 0.6459 1.1693 0.6635 70.1961
Savings banks 0.6721 0.5827 0.9312 0.4784 27.821
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.5678 0.6876 1.0908 0.5810 47.9492
Commercial banks 0.3864 0.7043 1.2553 0.7216 69.2157
Savings banks 0.7477 0.6210 1.0221 0.4963 26.8482
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.5775 0.6909 1.1012 0.5772 47.5586
Commercial banks 0.3999 0.7154 1.2589 0.7278 68.2353
Savings banks 0.7537 0.6177 1.0331 0.4837 27.0428
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Table 5: Evaluation of profit efficiency, crisis years (2008–2010)
Unconstrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.4894 1.3339 2.3275 2.0602 78.9744
Commercial banks 0.1848 0.6876 1.5601 1.4207 88.1579
Savings banks 0.6839 1.5896 2.5433 2.1764 73.1092
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.4256 1.1613 2.0747 1.7888 79.4872
Commercial banks 0.1734 0.6526 1.6478 1.3366 89.4737
Savings banks 0.5866 1.3710 2.1814 1.8877 73.1092
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.4518 1.2403 2.1488 1.9296 78.9744
Commercial banks 0.1894 0.6785 1.4393 1.3557 86.8421
Savings banks 0.6194 1.4710 2.3776 2.0473 73.9496
Price-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.6388 1.6889 3.1142 2.5064 79.4872
Commercial banks 0.1500 0.7199 1.6281 1.9161 90.7895
Savings banks 0.9510 2.0268 3.4294 2.5263 72.2689
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.5924 1.5676 2.9620 2.3115 80.0000
Commercial banks 0.1538 0.7473 1.9475 2.0455 92.1053
Savings banks 0.8725 1.8661 3.1464 2.3373 72.2689
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.5949 1.5762 3.0527 2.3066 80.5128
Commercial banks 0.1529 0.7330 1.9362 1.9789 92.1053
Savings banks 0.8772 1.8806 3.2621 2.3307 73.1092
Quantity-constrained profit model
All banks Inefficient banks %
efficient
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Manipulated
earnings model
All banks 0.3371 0.5742 1.0270 0.5435 67.1795
Commercial banks 0.3466 0.6312 1.1974 0.5965 71.0526
Savings banks 0.3310 0.5373 0.9378 0.4979 64.7059
Non-manipulated
short-run model
All banks 0.4127 0.7009 1.2192 0.6841 66.1538
Commercial banks 0.4373 0.8021 1.5107 0.7739 71.0526
Savings banks 0.3969 0.6311 1.0735 0.5913 63.0252
Non-manipulated
long-run model
All banks 0.4294 0.7466 1.3084 0.7402 67.1795
Commercial banks 0.4473 0.8192 1.5452 0.7870 71.0526
Savings banks 0.4180 0.6996 1.1844 0.6920 64.7059
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Table 6: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996), context
Unconstrained profit
model
Price-constrained
profit model
Quantity-constrained
profit model
Manipulated
earnings
model
Non-
manipulated
short-run
model
Non-
manipulated
long-run
model
Manipulated
earnings
model
Non-
manipulated
short-run
model
Non-
manipulated
long-run
model
Manipulated
earnings
model
Non-
manipulated
short-run
model
Non-
manipulated
long-run
model
f (Commercial banks) =
g(Savings banks)
All years
T-statistic 79.8544 82.5449 78.8027 92.5202 95.5660 95.7494 61.2968 62.7876 60.8816
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pre-crisis
T-statistic 97.6865 102.2428 100.7372 110.0211 113.5227 115.1802 79.4832 80.2015 78.9394
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Crisis
T-statistic 0.7665 1.0095 0.5387 1.3674 1.4602 1.3141 -0.2343 0.1059 -0.0890
p-value 0.2217 0.1564 0.2951 0.0858 0.0721 0.0944 0.5926 0.4578 0.5355
f (Pre-crisis) =
g(Crisis years)
All banks
T-statistic 7.8143 10.0694 10.2150 7.6519 8.4404 9.2960 6.9663 7.0359 7.8898
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Commercial
banks
T-statistic -0.5793 -0.3413 -0.5143 -0.5230 -0.4726 -0.4223 -0.7068 -0.6655 -0.5287
p-value 0.7188 0.6336 0.6965 0.6995 0.6818 0.6636 0.7602 0.7471 0.7015
Savings
banks
T-statistic 21.2829 22.3786 22.1329 20.5584 22.2176 23.3355 19.9471 20.1588 20.4850
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: the functions f (·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for each model being compared.
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Table 7: Distribution hypothesis tests (Li, 1996), model
All years Pre-crisis years Crisis years
All banks
Commercial
banks
Savings
banks
All banks
Commercial
banks
Savings
banks
All banks
Commercial
banks
Savings
banks
Unconstrained
profit model
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated short-run model)
T-statistic 0.2417 0.0412 0.0548 0.2290 0.0564 0.0545 -0.0060 0.0018 -0.0427
p-value 0.4045 0.4836 0.4781 0.4094 0.4775 0.4783 0.5024 0.4993 0.5170
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic 0.1803 0.1960 0.1229 0.2939 0.2031 0.3513 -0.0074 -0.0087 -0.0194
p-value 0.4284 0.4223 0.4511 0.3844 0.4195 0.3627 0.5030 0.5035 0.5077
f (Manipulated short-run model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic 0.0098 0.0311 0.2045 -0.0088 0.0029 0.1803 -0.0219 0.0127 -0.0290
p-value 0.4961 0.4876 0.4190 0.5035 0.4989 0.4285 0.5087 0.4949 0.5116
Price-constrained
profit model
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated short-run model)
T-statistic 0.1011 -0.0353 0.1356 0.1268 -0.0446 0.1496 -0.0847 -0.0336 -0.0257
p-value 0.4597 0.5141 0.4461 0.4495 0.5178 0.4405 0.5337 0.5134 0.5102
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic 0.1464 -0.0287 0.1726 0.2128 -0.0291 0.2066 -0.0282 -0.0265 0.0296
p-value 0.4418 0.5114 0.4315 0.4157 0.5116 0.4182 0.5112 0.5106 0.4882
f (Manipulated short-run model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic 0.0537 0.0130 -0.0240 0.0888 0.0190 -0.0092 0.0255 0.0000 0.0369
p-value 0.4786 0.4948 0.5096 0.4646 0.4924 0.5037 0.4898 0.5000 0.4853
Quantity-
constrained
profit model
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated short-run model)
T-statistic 0.5596 0.0203 1.1959 0.4995 0.0177 1.2681 0.1658 0.0116 0.1730
p-value 0.2879 0.4919 0.1159 0.3087 0.4929 0.1024 0.4341 0.4954 0.4313
f (Manipulated earnings model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic 0.5248 0.0336 1.5420 0.5721 0.0780 1.8972 0.0151 -0.0111 0.0634
p-value 0.2998 0.4866 0.0615 0.2836 0.4689 0.0289 0.4940 0.5044 0.4747
f (Manipulated short-run model) =
g(Non-manipulated long-run model)
T-statistic -0.2405 0.0573 -0.3249 -0.1672 0.0769 -0.2042 0.1489 0.1266 0.0350
p-value 0.5950 0.4771 0.6274 0.5664 0.4693 0.5809 0.4408 0.4496 0.4860
Notes: the functions f (·) and g(·) are (kernel) distribution functions for each model being compared.
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Figure 1: Synthesis of the proposed evaluation models
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Figure 2: Kernel density plots, unconstrained, price-constrained and quantity-constrained
profit models, by risk model
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Figure 3: Kernel density plots, unconstrained, price-constrained and quantity-constrained
profit models, by type of bank
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Figure 4: Transitions for the unconstrained profit model, manipulated earnings vs. non-
manipulated (short- and long-run), contour plots
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Figure 5: Transitions for the price-constrained profit model, manipulated earnings vs. non-
manipulated (short- and long-run), contour plots
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Figure 6: Transitions for the quantity-constrained profit model, manipulated earnings vs. non-
manipulated (short- and long-run), contour plots
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Figure 7: Transitions across unconstrained/price-constrained/quantity-constrained profit
model (manipulated earnings model), contour plots
All banks
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Figure 8: Transitions across unconstrained/price-constrained/quantity-constrained profit
model (non-manipulated short-run model), contour plots
All banks
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
1
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
a) Unconstrained profit model
vs. price-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
b) Unconstrained profit model
vs. quantity-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M1_cs_short
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
c) Price-constrained profit
model vs. quantity-constrained
profit model
Commercial banks
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short_banks
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
1
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
ba
nk
s
d) Unconstrained profit model
vs. price-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short_banks
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
ba
nk
s
e) Unconstrained profit model
vs. quantity-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M1_cs_short_banks
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
ba
nk
s
f) Price-constrained profit
model vs. quantity-constrained
profit model
Savings banks
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short_savings
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
1
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
sa
v
in
gs
g) Unconstrained profit model
vs. price-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M0_cs_short_savings
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
sa
v
in
gs
h) Unconstrained profit model
vs. quantity-constrained profit
model
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
0
.0
0
0
.0
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
ineff_ROA_M1_cs_short_savings
in
e
ff
_
R
O
A
_
M
2
_
cs
_
sh
o
rt
_
sa
v
in
gs
i) Price-constrained profit
model vs. quantity-constrained
profit model
37
Figure 9: Transitions across unconstrained/price-constrained/quantity-constrained profit
model (non-manipulated long-run model), contour plots
All banks
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